THE SEARCH FOR A WORKABLE STANDARD FOR
WHEN FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT COVERAGE
SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO PRISONER WORKERS

Matthew J. Langt
This Comment examines the variety of decisions that courts have
opined regarding the coverage of prisoner-laborers under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201 et. seq.). There has been little
guidance from Congress and the Supreme Court regarding whether or not
the FLSA covers working prisoners. This has resulted in disparate
treatment of prison laborers from state to state as lower courts have
interpreted the scope of the federal statute in different ways.
To resolve the inconsistencies that exist among the states, lower courts
need clear guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court to aid the
determination of whether certain types of prison labor are covered under
the FLSA. To help resolve this issue, a number of questions must be
addressed: In general, did Congress intend that FLSA be extended to cover
prisoner workers? If yes, does the coverage extend to all types of inmate
employment, or is it limited to certain kinds of prison work? If coverage is
limited, how should the courts determine what kind of work is covered and
what kind is not? Finally, if the FLSA is not generally applicable to
prisoner workers, is there any situation when working inmates should be
paid the minimum wage regardless of the question of applicability?
Part I of the Comment examines the resulting confusion spumed by
the refusal of Congress or the Supreme Court to address the issue of the
coverage of prison labor under the FLSA. By examining this confusion,
Part I focuses on the way in which circuit and district courts have analyzed
the coverage question. Part II of the Comment evaluates the different
"economic reality tests" that courts have applied to determine the validity
of prison FLSA claims and the types of working situations that have
triggered coverage. Part Ill outlines the distinctions that courts have drawn
regarding "inside" and "outside" labor cases and "public" and "private"
employers. Finally, Part IV of the Comment outlines and supports a new
*J.D. 2002, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1999, Queen's University
at Kingston, Canada.
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test to determine when prison labor should be covered by the FLSA and
calls for the Supreme Court or Congress to rectify the confusion among the
circuits.
I.

THE "PLAIN MEANING" OF THE FLSA

The FLSA, as enacted in 1938, requires employers to compensate
their employees at the rate of the current Congressionally-mandated
minimum wage.' Since its enactment, a variety of amendments to the
FLSA have been passed, primarily to broaden the Act's coverage to
employees who had previously been excluded from coverage.2 Over time,
Congress has also exempted certain classes of workers from coverage. 3
Prison laborers have never been included on any list that specifically grants
or exempts them from coverage.
Some courts have held that the FLSA may cover all employees unless
Congress has specifically exempted them in another section of the Act.4In
keeping with this rationale, these courts have held that since Congress has
not specifically exempted prisoners, they must be included within the
FLSA's coverage.5 To support this holding, these courts have cited the
various amendments to the list of exempted workers and concluded that
Congress' choice not to list inmate workers indicates its desire to extend
FLSA coverage to inmate laborers. 6
1. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(2002). Since September 1, 1997, the federal hourly
minimum wage has been $5.15. Id.
2. The most substantial amendment was enacted in 1974 when Congress extended
FLSA coverage to all state and local government employees. See Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a), 88 Stat. 55, 59-60 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 203). The amendment was reenacted after a number of suits were brought challenging its
constitutionality. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (holding that states are not
immune from federal regulations such as the minimum wage provisions of the FLSA for
their "traditional state functions").
3. Congress has expressly exempted many groups of employees from coverage. See
29 U.S.C. § 213 (2002) (exempting school teachers, outdoor salesmen, babysitters); 29
U.S.C. § 214(a)(2002) (exempting "learners, apprentices, messengers").
4. See Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 702 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that the
framework of the FLSA "strongly suggests that Congress intended... [to] include all
workers not specifically excepted.").
5. See Hale v. Ariz., 967 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1992) (hereinafter Hale I) (holding
that the general definition of "employee" followed by several specific exemptions suggested
that Congress intended an all-encompassing definition of the term "employee" to include all
workers not specifically exempted, including prisoner workers), rev'd in part en banc on
other grounds, 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993), (hereinafter Hale II); Carter v. Dutchess
Cmty. Coll., 735 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1984) (supporting argument that prisoners are not on
the extensive list of workers expressly exempted from FLSA coverage).
6. Hale 1, 967 F.2d at 1363 ("[Ilt would be an encroachment upon the legislative
prerogative for a court to hold that a class of unlisted workers is excluded from the Act"),
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The Supreme Court has also lent credence to the proposition that listed
exemptions are exhaustive. In Powell v. United States CartridgeCo.,7 the
Court reasoned that Congressional "specificity in stating exemptions
strengthens the implication that employees not thus exempted... remain
within the Act.",8 Under this rationale, since prisoners are not a group that
has been specifically exempted from the Act, this omission indicates that
they are covered.
In spite of this argument, most courts have held that the FLSA is
inapplicable to prisoner workers. 9 Some of these courts argue that it makes
no fundamental difference that prisoners are not specifically exempted
from FLSA coverage. These "non-coverage" courts argue that Congress
need not exempt prisoners from the FLSA because they cannot be defined
as a class of "employees" to which the Act applies in the first place.1"
Under this rationale, because inmate laborers cannot be considered
"employees" under the Act, they cannot be subject to any of the provisions
of the FLSA. These "non-coverage" courts hold that the lists of exempted
workers were promulgated to address certain classes of workers that
normally would be considered "employees" but for the exemption.
Therefore, because prisoners are a class of workers that cannot be
considered "employees," there is no presumption of coverage to begin with
and no exemption is needed to exclude them.
A.

Whether Inmates are "Employees" for FLSA Purposes

The first question that courts need to address, therefore, is whether
Congress intended inmate workers to be considered "employees" for FLSA
purposes. If they find that prison laborers are not "employees," then there
is no need for further analysis. However, if they find that inmate workers
can be considered "employees," then the courts must make a determination
of whether or not Congress meant them to be covered.
To make the "employee" determination, courts have looked first to the
quoting Carter,735 F.2d at 13.
7. 339 U.S. 497 (1950).
8. Id. at517.
9. See, e.g., Gambetta v. Prison Rehabilitative Indus. & Diversified Enters. Inc., 112
F.3d 1119 (11th Cir. 1997); Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1996);
Reimonenq v. Foti, 72 F.3d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1996), Henthorn v.Dep't of Navy, 29 F.3d
682, 684-87 (D.C. Cir. 1994); McMaster v. Minn., 30 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1994); Harker
v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1993); Franks v. Okla. State Indus., 7 F.3d 971,
972 (10th Cir. 1993); Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1992); Vanskike v. Peters,
974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992); Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir.
1991).
10. See, e.g., Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 807 n.2 (arguing that pointing to a list of
exemptions offers nothing "because it assumes that prisoners plainly come within the
meaning of the term 'employees,"' which is not the case).
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language of the Act itself. The FLSA defines an employee as "any
individual employed by an employer."' Furthermore, the FLSA defines
"[e]mploy" as "to suffer or permit to work."12 Not surprisingly, the generic
nature of these definitions has rendered them unhelpful to courts looking
for guidance in determining whether prisoner workers are "employees".
Because the plain meaning of the Act has added little to the FLSA
analysis, courts have had to look to other theories of statutory construction
for help. Some have looked to the purposes underlying the FLSA to
determine whether Congress would have wanted prisoner workers to be
covered. 3 Sections 202(a) and (b) of 29 U.S.C. set forth that the general
purpose of the FLSA was to eliminate substandard labor conditions
throughout the nation.14 To do so, Congress wanted to enable workers to
maintain a "minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency,
and general well-being.... "" As such, the FLSA-covered worker was
guaranteed at least a minimum wage, with the assumption that these funds
would be used to provide the necessities of life for employees and their
families. Those opposing FLSA coverage for prisoner workers have
argued that because prisons provide inmates with these necessities in life
- food, shelter and clothing - that the minimum wage is not required.
Even courts that are more responsive to the coverage question acknowledge
that "the problem of substandard living conditions,
which is the primary
7
concern of the FLSA, does not apply to prisoners."'
Therefore, proponents of coverage must grapple with the argument
that prisoners automatically enjoy the necessities that the FLSA was passed
to guarantee. Proponents may argue that the livelihood of the inmates'
families must be considered. They may also cite the reoccurrence of crime
among poor ex-convicts, arguing that these non-compensated ex-prisoners
will be more likely to commit future crimes upon release because they have
no money to re-establish themselves in their communities.
One federal project that has taken these concerns and tried to resolve
them is the Prison Industry Enhancement ("PIE") program. 18 The PIE
11. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1)(2002).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g)(2002).
13. See, e.g., Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 812; Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1397.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 202(a)-(b)(2002).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)(2002).
16. See, e.g., Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1396 (holding that the problem of substandard living
conditions does not apply to prisoners); Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th
Cir. 1993) (holding that there is no need to protect the standard of living for prisoners
because they do not have to purchase food, shelter or clothing); Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 810
(holding that paying prisoners minimum wage "would not further the policy of ensuring a
'minimum standard of living"').
17. Hale 11, 993 F.2d at 1396.
18. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2906, 104 Stat. 4789, 4914
(1990) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)).
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project created fifty prison work pilot programs in which prisoners are paid
at prevailing local rates for voluntarily producing goods. Wages earned by
the inmates are subject to deductions for taxes, room and board, family
support payments, and contributions to victim compensation funds. 9 The
program has been lauded as a success because "[it] has been successful in
teaching inmates marketable skills, reducing the need for their families to
receive public assistance, decreasing the net cost of operating correctional
facilities, and breaking the recidivist cycle. 20 Under this program, the
necessities of life that the FLSA was passed to guarantee have been made
applicable to prisoner workers by changing the way that the government
treats their work and living arrangements.
Courts have also examined adjunct goals of the FLSA to determine
whether prisoner workers should be covered. One such goal was to
eliminate the competitive advantages that were caused by the prevalence of
substandard working conditions and the usage of cheap labor.21 Congress
recognized that the employers utilizing substandard labor conditions were
enabled to charge lower prices for their goods. This resulted in these
employers gaining an unfair competitive advantage over other employers
and in the spreading of the substandard conditions to all labor in the same
industry. Employers who were paying more for labor and providing
employees with adequate working conditions could not compete with the
cheaper alternative. In Powell, the Supreme Court acknowledged this
problem, explaining that the allowance of any group of workers to work
below the minimum wage tends to depress wages in general and threaten
the standard of living of other workers in competing industries. 2
Some inmate claimants seeking coverage have argued that this theory
is equally applicable to prison labor. 2 ' They have argued that the allowance
of lower wages in industries that utilize prison labor can also affect living
and labor conditions of other employees in similar industries because
employers who can utilize prisoner workers will always do so to save
money and gain a competitive advantage. This results in all employers in
the industry having to seek the cheap alternative of prison labor or suffer
the consequences of higher operating costs. The courts that have agreed
with this argument hold that "the absence of a level playing field between
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(c)(2002).
20. S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)(3)(2002).
22. See Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1950). Cf Brooklyn Sav.
Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945) (warning that allowing any group of worker to work
below the minimum wage tends to depress wages and threaten the standard of living of
other workers in competing industries).
23. See Hale I1, 993 F.2d at 1401-02 (Norris, J. dissenting) (arguing that an increase in
the supply of goods produced by cheap inmate labor inevitably undercuts the bargaining
power of the free workers whom Congress designed the FLSA to protect).
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prison and private sector... will 'spread and perpetuate' unemployment
and substandard labor conditions among workers ... ,,24 Thus, the issue of
prisoner compensation cannot be limited to the inmates themselves; the
issue affects all laborers.
Most courts, however, have not been swayed by the unfair
competition argument. One circuit that has a particular problem with the
unfair competition argument has held that this rationale would result in
problematic situations if taken to its natural end.21 In Vanskike v. Peters,26
the Seventh Circuit argued that if applied to this end, every service that a
prisoner performed, whether it be sweeping floors, cleaning bathrooms, or
washing dishes, would need to be compensated by the minimum wage
because the prisoners were taking the jobs away from legitimate nonprisoner employees.
The court rejected the notion that Congress would
have approved of paying the minimum wage for anything done in the
prison that could be considered "work. 28
Other courts have rejected the unfair competition argument on the
grounds that the primary goal of prison labor is not for profit. 29 Under this
rationale, prison labor is viewed as part of inmate rehabilitation and
punishment and cannot be seen as "employment" in the FLSA sense of the
word. a° Other courts have held that the unfair competition argument fails
because of the small size of the prison labor industry. These courts argue
that few prison programs compete with the private market and that this
results in a de minimis effect of cheaper prison labor on the general
employment market.3
B.

The Ashurst-Sumners Act

A final argument that courts have cited to refute the unfair competition
claim rests on the terms of the Ashurst-Sumners Act. 32 Passed three years
prior to the FLSA, Congress sought to eliminate the problem of unfair
competition from prisoner-made goods by criminalizing their knowing
interstate transportation.3 3
One circuit has argued that a 'logical
24. Id. at 1402.
25. See, e.g., Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992).
26. Id.
27. Id. at811.
28. Id. See also discussion on inside versus outside prison work infra pp. 27-30.
29. See, e.g., Gilbreath v. CutterBiological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1326 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the purposes of prison labor are to provide vocational training and to develop
effective work habits).
30. Id. (listing the purposes of prison programs in Arizona).
31. Id.
32. Ashurst-Sumners Act, Pub. L. No. 74-215, 49 Stat. 494 (1935) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761-1762).
33. Section (a) of the Act provides:
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inconsistency' would be created between the FLSA and the AshurstSumners Act, if the FLSA was applicable to prisoners.34 In Vanskike, the
Seventh Circuit held that it would have been superfluous for Congress to
criminalize the transportation of prison goods produced by a group of
workers that were mandated to be properly compensated under the FLSA.35
For if prisoners were covered by the FLSA, there would be no need for the
Ashurst-Sumners Act because the FLSA would eliminate the "low-laborcost-advantage" by making prison labor just as expensive as similar work
in the free market. 36 Thus, the problem that the Ashurst-Sumners Act was
designed to remedy would be non-existent.
II.

THE ECONOMIC REALITY ANALYSES

Although the plain meaning of the word "employee" and the
legislative intent of the FLSA provide some insight as to whether prisoner
workers should be covered, most courts have considered a number of other
factors before reaching a conclusion. The Supreme Court, although silent
on prison labor and the FLSA in general, has held that coverage by the
FLSA hinges on the "economic reality" of the employment situation.37 To
determine whether a type of working relationship is covered, the Court has
indicated that this test should be applied with the totality of the
circumstances of the economic reality in mind."
The "economic reality" analysis of prison labor has gone through
three distinct phases marked by benchmark cases that have established
different standards for evaluating prisoner FLSA claims. The first two
periods can be distinguished by cases brought before and after the Ninth
Circuit decided Bonnette v. CaliforniaHealth & Welfare Agency 39 in 1983.
The third period can be distinguished by the cases brought after the
Seventh Circuit decided Vanskike v. Peters in 1992.

(a) Whoever knowingly transports in interstate commerce or from any foreign country into
the United States any goods, wares, or merchandise manufactured, produced, or mined,
wholly or in part by convicts or prisoners, except convicts or prisoners on parole, supervised
release, or probation, or in any penal or reformatory institution, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(1)(2002).
34. See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 1992).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (holding that
the 'economic reality' rather than any 'technical concept' shall be the test of whether a
worker is an 'employee' under the FLSA); citing United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947);
Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
38. See, e.g., Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 33; Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 722.

39. 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
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The FirstPeriod: Pre-Bonnette Economic Reality

Before 1983, courts generally considered three factors when
examining the economic reality of the working relationship to which
prisoners are subjected: (1) whether the labor was performed inside or
outside the prison walls; (2) whether the labor was compelled or voluntary;
and (3) whether the employing agency was the state or a private company.40
Without any clear guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court,
each circuit chose to give more weight to some factors, ignore certain
factors, or add new factors to the test. A summary of the pertinent preBonnette case law follows:
1. Huntley v. Gunn Furniture Co.:41 In 1948, the federal district court
in Western Michigan became the first court to address prisoner workers'
rights under the FLSA. Prisoners in a Michigan penitentiary were assigned
to work on the assembly of shell casings that the Gunn Furniture Company
supplied to the United States War Division.4 ' The inmates sued to recover
minimum wages and overtime pay. In denying the prisoners' claim, the
court held that the definition of "employment" under the FLSA did not
apply to inmate workers who had no contractual relationship with their
supposed employer, the prison. 43 The court also rejected the inmates' claim
that they were "employees" of the private business, Gunn Furniture,
holding that they were prisoners confined by the Michigan state prison
industry, and could not be considered "employees" of Gunn Furniture
under the FLSA. 44
2. Sims v. Parke Davis & Co.:4 1 In 1971, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a
lower court's denial of FLSA claims by prisoners who performed janitorial,
clerical, and cooking services for two companies which conducted clinical
research on the prison premises. In their analysis of the "economic reality"
of the working situation, the court gave special attention to factor (3)
(whether the employing agency was a public or private entity), stating that
although the inmates were working for a private entity, the corporations
had relinquished their rights to hire, fire, or control the working conditions

40. Each circuit has used any combination of the three factors. Without any clear
guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court, the circuits conducted the "economic
reality" test on a case by case basis. See generally, Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931
F.2d 1320, 1330 (9th Cir. 1991) (summarizing the variety of "economic reality" findings of
the circuit courts).
41. 79 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Mich. 1948).
42. Id. at 111.
43. Id. at 115.
44. Id. at 113 ("It is clear that the labor of the plaintiffs as inmates of the State prison
belonged to the State of Michigan .... ").
45. 334 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd, 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971).

2002]

FLSA COVERAGE FOR PRISONERS

46
The court emphasized the fact that the State had
of the inmates.
established the terms of employment and the rate of pay that the prisoners
making the inmates employees of the State and not the
were to receive,
• 47
In holding against the inmates, the court also concluded
corporations.
under factors (1) and (2) that all of the work was performed on prison
grounds and that the prisoners were assigned to perform the work by prison
officials as part of their sentences.48
3. Alexander v. Sara, Inc.: 4 9 In 1983, the Fifth Circuit joined the
prevailing mentality of its sister circuits when it held that inmates who
were compelled to work for a private blood-plasma corporation were not
entitled to the minimum wage.5 ° In examining all three factors, the court
concluded that the work was on prison grounds; that the prisoners were
compelled to work for the companies as part of their sentences; and that
"there was no employer-employee relationship, because the inmates' labor
belonged to the penitentiary, which was the sole party to the contract with
Sara.' '5' The court also stated that "the Congressional concern in enacting
the [FLSA] was with the standard of living and the general well-being of
the worker in American industry, so52that the extension to the prison inmate
was not legislatively contemplated.,

B.

PrisonerWorker FLSA Claims After Bonnette v. California & Welfare
Agency 3

Thus, before 1983, the circuit courts were generally anti-coverage,
typically applying their "economic reality" tests stringently and then
expounding dicta proclaiming doubt that Congress had ever intended
inmate workers to be covered by the FLSA. However, after 1983, some
courts began to apply different tests for determining the "economic reality"
of a prison work situation. One such test that proved much more favorable
to inmate claims was established in the benchmark case, Bonnette v.

46. Id. at 787.
47. Id. ("[Tlhe private corporations have relinquished their normal rights: (1) to
determine when, and whether, their enterprises need additional help; (2) to select the
members of their work force; (3) to remove from their work force members with whom they
are dissatisfied; (4) to control that labor force except in the most routine matters.").
48. The Sims court, in dicta, indicated a strong opposition to inmate rights under the
FLSA. The court stated that it was unlikely that Congress had considered any of the
variables unique to the prison work as rehabilitation when it adopted general labor
legislation. Id.
49. 721 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1983).
50. Id. at 150.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
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CaliforniaHealth & Welfare Agency. 4
In Bonnette, the Ninth Circuit created a more refined "economic
reality" test to try to solve the confusion and arbitrariness of the prevailing
case-by-case analyses of whether certain working conditions constituted
"employment" under the FLSA.
The court's four-factor standard
considered "whether the alleged employer: (1) had the power to hire and
fire the employees; (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules
or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate and method of
payment; and (4) maintained employment records. 55 The court cautioned
that the factors were not exclusive, and that the determination of whether
an employer-employee relationship existed could not depend on isolated
factors and must be based "upon the circumstances of the whole activity. 56
Although the factual situation in Bonnette did not involve prison
workers,57 within a year many circuit courts began applying the Bonnette
Factors to prison labor cases. Some of the more influential cases are set
forth below:
1. Carter v. Dutchess Community College:58 After applying the four
Bonnette Factors, the Second Circuit overturned and remanded the district
court's summary judgment order against an inmate who had served as a
tutor for a private community college that offered classes to inmates inside
the prison. The court admonished the lower court's holding that the FLSA
is inapplicable to prison work programs simply because the state exercised
"occasional control" over the employer in decisions about the inmates'
working situation.5 9 Instead, the court held that "an inmate may be entitled
under the law to receive the federal minimum wage from an outside
employer, depending on how many typical employer prerogatives are
exercised over the inmate by the outside employer, and to what extent." 60
2. Watson v. Graves:61In 1990, the Fifth Circuit became the first court
to grant prisoners "employee" status under the FLSA.
The court
determined that inmates who had voluntarily worked for a private
construction company outside the jail must be paid the minimum wage.62
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1470.

56. Id. quoting Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 772, 730 (1947).
57. The case involved the FLSA claims of individuals who provided in home care to
disabled public assistance recipients against the state and county agencies which employed
them. Id. at 1467.
58. 735 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1984).
59. "It runs counter to the breadth of the statute and to the Congressional intent to
impose a qualification which permits an employer who exercises substantial control over a
worker, but whose hiring decisions occasionally
may be subjected to a third party's veto, to escape compliance with the Act." Id. at 12.
60. Id. at 14.
61. 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990).
62. Id. at 1555-56.
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The court came to this conclusion as a result of the Bonnette Factors,
finding that the private employer had both supervisory powers and the
ability to hire and fire the inmates, as well as the ability to set the rate and
method of payment. 6 ' The court ignored the record-keeping prong since no
records were kept.
After Watson, courts became more hesitant to apply the seemingly
pro-inmate Bonnette Factors. In Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc.,64 the
Ninth Circuit refused to apply the Bonnette Factors and reached the
opposite result from Watson.65 The Gilbreath court held that inmates
voluntarily working for a private plasma treatment center that operated
inside the prison were not employees under the FLSA.66 The court reverted
back to the pre-Bonnette "economic reality" test, and relying solely on the
third "agency" prong held that the state had more control over the working
relationship than did the private company. 67 In keeping with the preBonette precedent, the Gilbreath court, in dicta, expounded its opinion that
Congress never intended the FLSA to cover prisoner workers:
A review of the FLSA in the light of its evident purpose and
legislative history, conducted with an eye guided by common
sense and common intelligence, leads me to the inescapable
conclusion that it is highly implausible that Congress intended
the FLSA's minimum wage protection be extended to felons
serving time in prison. This is a category of persons.., whose
civil rights are subject to suspension and whose work in prison
could be accurately characterized in an economic sense as
involuntary servitude. 61
The Bonnette Factors received their most scathing criticism in
Vanskike v. Peters in which the Seventh Circuit held that the test failed to
realize the true nature of compelled labor performed in state
penitentiaries. 69 The court admonished the factors, stating that they
presupposed a free labor system and were not applicable to the involuntary
servitude that is the reality of prison labor. 7
63. Id. at 1555. The court also took note of the fact that the inmates were not required
to work as part of their sentences. Consequently, their labor did not "belong" to the jail. Id.
at 1556.
64. 931 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1991).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1326-27.
67. Judge Trott concluded that the state's "complete control" over its inmates was
inconsistent with the "economic reality" of a true employer-employee relationship. Id. at
1325.

68. Id. at 1324-25. The Seventh and Fourth Circuits have decided cases under the same
rationale as Gilbreath without using the Bonnette Factors. See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d
806 (7th Cir. 1992); Harker v. State Use Indus., 990 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1993).
69. 974 F.2d at 806.
70. Id. at 809. "The control that the DOC exercises over a prisoner is nearly total, and

202

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 5:1

The court was also concerned that the Bonnette test, when applied to
the prison context, would lead to the "radical result" that all prison labor
inside penal institutions, from laundry to janitorial work would be subject
to the minimum wage laws. The court noted that no court had ever
suggested that the FLSA applied to such labor.7' Notably, however, the
Vanskike court limited its holding to state employed work, as opposed to
This distinction provides the
inmate work for private companies.
framework for most current inmate labor cases, described in Part IV.
C.

The Hale Cases

Post-Vanskike, the most influential cases dealing with inmate FLSA
Hale
claims arose out of the Ninth Circuit. In Hale v. Arizona (hereinafter
73
brought FLSA
1)72, two groups of inmates (the Fuller and Hale inmates)
claims against the state of Arizona. In Arizona, as opposed to many other
states, all prisoners were compelled, as part of their prison sentences, to
perform hard labor for the state. Furthermore, under Arizona law, the state
74
agencies that utilized prison labor were considered "private enterprises.
This proved to be a major setback for state interests, since this law required
inmates to forgo any argument that the state and not a private entity was
employing them.
The Fuller inmates performed a variety of jobs for a private employer,
ARCOR Enterprises, inside of the prison walls. In applying the Bonnette
Factors, the panel found that the private company was responsible for (1)
hiring and firing the inmates; (2) supervising and controlling the work; (3)
determining the rate and method of pay; and (4) maintaining any existing
employment records.75
The single appellant from the Hale inmate group had worked as an
office manager for a business which participated in an Inmate-Operated
Business Enterprise (IOBE) program.76 The court assessed the economic
reality of the Hale inmate by utilizing the Bonnette Factors and concluded
similarly that the private enterprise hired and fired the inmates and paid

control over his work is merely incidental to that general control. [This] supports the idea
that a prisoner performing required work for the prison is actually engaged in involuntary
servitude, not employment." Id.
71. See id. at 809-810.
72. 967 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1992).
73. Named for the claims that the two groups of inmates brought against the state of
Arizona: Fuller v. Arizona and Hale v. Arizona. The claims were consolidated and were
given the case name Hale v. Arizona.
74. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 41-1623(D)(3) (2001).
75. Hale 1, 967 F.2d at 1366.
76. Id. at 1360.
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their wages. 77 The panel also harked back to a previous concern,
concluding that the inmates had produced goods that were introduced into
the outside commerce and therefore posited an unfair competitive
advantage to the private enterprises involved in the buying of the inmates
labor.78
The Hale I decision did not sit well within the Ninth Circuit,
especially in light of the fact that the same court had decided Gilbreath in
1991, a case which presented a complete conflict in reasoning to Hale I.
The court, therefore, reheard the case en banc and issued a new opinion,
Hale II, in 1993. 79 In Hale 11, the court reversed the panel and held that
prisoners who had worked inside the prison, in a prison structured program,
pursuant to the state's requirement of "hard labor," were not employees
within the purview of the FLSA. s0 The Hale I court also joined the
Seventh Circuit's Vanskike opinion in holding that the Bonnette Factors
were inapplicable to inmate labor since the relationship between the state
and the inmates was custodial.8'
The court also acknowledged that its decision was consistent with the
purpose of the FLSA, in that the concerns with substandard living
conditions and unfair competition were not applicable to prison labor.82
D.

The "Inside Work" Issue Resolved

The Seventh Circuit's decision in Vanskike and the Ninth Circuit's
decision in Hale H became influential in settling the debate over coverage
for inmate work conducted within prison walls. Each subsequent circuit
that addressed the question of inside prison work concluded that inmates
should not be considered employees under the FLSA.8 3
The oft-cited opinion of the Second Circuit in Danneskjold v.
Hausrath84 summarized the reasoning in Vanskike and Hale II when it held
77. Id. at 1367.
78. Id.
79. Hale v. Arizona (hereinafter Hale I1), 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
80. Id. at 1395.
81. Id. at 1394.
82. Id. at 1396 ("We agree with Arizona that the problem of substandard living
conditions, which is the primary concern of the FLSA, does not apply to prisoners, for
whom clothing, shelter, and food are provided by the prison"), citing Vanskike v. Peters,
974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1992) (quotation not included).
83. Gambetta v. Prison Rehabilitative Indus. & Diversified Enters. Inc., 112 F.3d 1119
(11th Cir. 1997); Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1996); Reimonenq v.
Foti, 72 F.3d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1996), Henthorn v. Dep't of Navy, 29 F.3d 682, 684-87
(D.C. Cir. 1994); McMaster v. Minn., 30 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1994); Franks v. Okla.
State Indus., 7 F.3d 971, 972 (10th Cir. 1993); Miller v. Dukakis, 961 F.2d 7, 8-9 (1st Cir.
1992).
84. 82 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1996).
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that:
The relationship [between prisoner and prison] is not one of
employment; prisoners are taken out of the national economy;
prison work is often designed to train and rehabilitate.., and
most such labor does not compete with private employers ....
As a result, no Court of Appeals has ever questioned the power of
a correctional institution to compel inmates to perform services
for the institution without paying the minimum wage. Prisoners
may thus be ordered to cook, staff the library, perform janitorial
services, work in the laundry.... Such work occupies prisoners'
time that might otherwise be filled by mischief, it trains prisoners
in discipline and skills of work; and is a method of seeing that
prisoners bear a cost of their incarceration.85
A major reason that courts have held the FLSA inapplicable to inside
prison labor is because it has been established that courts hearing such
cases should not apply the "economic reality" tests set forth in Bonnette
and Carter. In Reimonenq v. Foti,86 the Fifth Circuit summarized why the
Bonnette test was "unserviceable" in the jailer-inmate context:
The test has a natural bias that favors a finding that the prison
custodian is the inmate's "employer" because of the considerable
[T]he factors fail
control a jailer must exercise over inmates ....
to capture the true nature of the relationship between an inmate
and prison custodian for essentially they presuppose a free labor
situation. Put simply, the control over the inmate does not stem
from any remunerative relationship bargained-for 87exchange of
labor for consideration, but from incarceration itself.
The test has been held inapplicable whether or not the labor is voluntary
18
and regardless of whether a private contractor is involved.
Thus, although the Supreme Court or Congress has not grappled the
issue, the circuits are in agreement that all inside prison work is not
covered by the FLSA and thus inmate workers may be paid less than the
minimum wage. However, the issue of whether inmate workers are covered
for work outside of the prison walls has been a much more contentious
issue for the circuits, with no overriding precedent guiding the few cases
which have been decided.

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 42-43.
72 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 475, citing Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 809-810.
Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 44.
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III. WORK EXCHANGE PROGRAMS AND OTHER FORMS OF OUTSIDE
WORK

Watson and Carter remain the two seminal cases that have granted
coverage to prisoner workers. The inmates in these cases voluntarily
contracted with private companies that directly paid and supervised them.
This section examines the variety of claims that have been brought under
the purview of Watson and how the circuits have dealt with outside prison
work in general.
Circuits that have agreed with the prevailing reasoning for inside
prison work have often been wary not to make a per se ruling that prisoners
may never be considered employees for purposes of the FLSA. s9 Many of
these same courts have made statements consistent with the holdings in
Watson and Carter; that certain prison work should be covered under the
FLSA. 90 Problems arise because there are a variety of situations that fall in
between Watson and a simple inside prison FLSA claim.
The circuits have struggled to try to identify a clear standard to govern
these difficult cases. The most prevalent cases are set forth below:
1. Henthorn v. Department of Navy:9' In 1994 the D.C. Circuit was
presented with a coverage claim by an inmate who worked at the U.S.
Naval Air Station as a janitor and "ranchhand. '92 Henthorn was assigned to
the position and paid by the Bureau of Prisons, which also controlled his
terms of employment. In attempting to construct a test to identify
cognizable prisoner claims, the court rejected both an inside/outside the
prison distinction and a public/private employer distinction.93 Instead, the
court issued a comprehensive burden-shifting approach. First, the inmate
must meet a two-pronged requirement to survive a motion to dismiss. The
inmate worker must prove that (1) the work performed was done without
legal compulsion (i.e., that it was not part of a hard-labor requirement in
the prisoner's sentence); and (2) that the compensation received was set
and paid by a non-prison source.94 If the inmate's claim passes this test, the
court would then run the "economic reality" test set forth in Bonnette.
89. See, e.g., id. at 40 ("[W]e do not disturb Carter's rejection of a rule that a prisoner's
labor is at all times and in all circumstances exempt from the FLSA"); Hale H,967 F.2d at
1393 (finding that the FLSA may be applicable to prisoners in certain circumstances);
Vanskike, 974 F.2d at 808 ("prisoners are not categorically excluded from the FLSA's
coverage simply because they are prisoners").
90. See, e.g., Villarreal v. Woodman, 113 F.3d 202, 207 (lth Cir. 1997) quoting
Henthorn 29 F.3d at 686 ("[T]he more indicia of traditional free-market employment the
prisoner and his putative employer bears, the more likely it is that FLSA will govern the
employment relationship.").
91. 29 F.3d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
92. Id. at 683.
93. Id. at 685.
94. Id. at 687.
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In this way, the court purported to avoid the concerns that Vanskike
and the other circuits had with the Bonnette test. By mandating "preBonnette factor" test, the D.C. Circuit made it a requirement that a free
labor situation existed (and not the penological nature of the relationship
that usually exists between jailer and inmate), before the economic nature
of the relationship was put at issue.
When applied to the facts of the case, the court concluded that because
Henthorn's sentence required hard labor and since he was assigned and
paid by the Bureau of Prisons and not by any private employer, he failed
the test to survive the motion for dismissal. This test has been applied to
95
all prison labor cases that have arisen in the District of Columbia.
2. Barnett v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n 96 In 1999, in a case that
may prove seminal, the Eighth Circuit overturned a district court's
dismissal of a coverage claim by an inmate who had worked for the YMCA
in a work-release program. Inmate Barnett was picked up by YMCA
employees each morning and brought to work where he provided
maintenance functions for the facility without any supervision or "spotchecks" by prison officials. 97 The YMCA had the power to hire and fire
Barnett, controlled his terms of employment and rate of pay and maintained
employment records.
The Eighth Circuit, which had joined the other circuits in refusing to
extend coverage to inside prison labor, 98 cited Henthorn when it held that
Barnett had "'freely contracted with the YMCA' to sell his labor". 99 The
court held that the facts in the case were similar to those in Carter and
Watson, in that (1) the suit was being brought against a private entity and
not against a branch or representative of the state government; (2) that
Barnett had volunteered his labor and was not compelled to perform hard
labor through his sentence; and (3) that he was supervised and paid directly
by the private entity with little or no involvement by the prison industry.'0°

95. See Nicastro v. Reno, 84 F.3d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (denying coverage to inmates
who had worked for the Federal Prison Industries because they failed the Henthorn test's
requirement that the prisoner must freely contract with a non-prison employer to sell his
labor, and the FPI was controlled by the government).
96. 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3412 (8th Cir. Mar. 4, 1999).
97. Id. at *2.
98. See McMaster v. Minn., 30 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Inmates who are
required to work as part of their sentences and perform labor within a correctional facility as
part of a state-run prison industries program are not 'employees' under the FLSA.").
99. Barnett, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3412, at *2.
100. Id. at *8.
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IV. A WORKABLE NEW STANDARD AND A CALL FOR HELP FROM THE
SUPREME COURT

As evidenced above, a firm standard on when prisoner workers may
be covered under the FLSA has eluded the circuits. Although unsettled by
the Supreme Court, it seems clear that that inside prison work is not subject
to the minimum wage. Many of the courts which are staunch advocates of
this holding, however, caution that this per se rule cannot and should not be
applied to all prison labor situations. A new standard is necessary to guide
courts in their determination of when certain kinds of labor must be
compensated through the minimum wage laws. The standard set forth in
Henthorn seems to be the most comprehensive set forth to date and so I
work from the D.C. Circuit's approach, with a few adjustments.
The first test should be whether or not the inmate is able to survive a
motion to dismiss. This will help maximize judicial economy by
alleviating the adjudication of frivolous claims. To survive this first
standard, the inmate laborer must prove that (1) his labor is not compelled
by his sentence and therefore not done out of legal compulsion, and (2) that
his "employer" is a private entity and not a representative of the state or
federal government. If the inmate can prove these two facts, he has
established that there may be an "indicia of [a] traditional, free-market
employment relationship between the prisoner and his putative
'employer.'" 0 '
Furthermore, by mandating that these minimum requirements be met,
the new standard allows correctional institutions to compel inmates to
perform the variety of tasks that serve the institutional missions of the
prison. These duties such as cooking, cleaning and laundry ensure that
prisoners bear a cost of their incarceration and trains prisoners in the
discipline and skills of work.
The two-pronged dismissal test also avoids all "economic reality"
analysis. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits correctly held that these
economic tests "fail to capture the true nature of [most prison employment]
relationship[s] for essentially they presuppose a free labor situation."1°2
However, if the prison laborer can establish that he is working for a
private employer and that his work is not legally compelled by his
sentence, then some form of "economic reality" test is warranted. As the
Henthorn court stated:
In cases such as Watson and Carter where the prisoner is
voluntarily selling his labor in exchange for a wage paid by an
employer other than the prison itself, the Fair Labor Standards

101. Henthom v. Dept. of Navy, 29 F.2d 682, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
102. Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Act may apply. In such cases, it makes sense to apply the fourfactor "economic reality" test to determine the extent to which
the prisoner's relationship with his putative
employer bears
03
indicia of traditional employment concepts. 1
Thus, when an inmate participates in a non-obligatory work release
program, where he is paid by an outside employer, he should be able to
state a claim under the FLSA for compensation at the minimum wage. The
Ninth Circuit's Bonnette Factor test is comprehensive enough to determine
if the employer-prisoner relationship is similar to traditional employment
arrangements.
The test should therefore be adopted with a few
adjustments.
The test focuses on whether the employer (1) had the power to hire
and fire the employee; (2) supervised and controlled the employees work
schedules and conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate and
method of payment; and (4) maintained employment records. The first
three factors go to the heart of whether or not there exists a traditional
employment relationship. The fourth should be removed, for even if
comprehensive records are not kept, there may still be an employment
relationship. The absence of such records should not be fatal to an FLSA
claim. This "economic reality" test should also be based upon the totality
of circumstances so that no one factor is given undue weight over any
other.
This framework serves both to protect the interests of the
prison laborers and to keep with Congress's motivations for passing
the FLSA in the first place. By implementing a preliminary barrier
requiring inmates to show that their labor situation is similar to that
of the norm, the standard does not allow for over-inclusive claims.
In this way, the state is free to compel inmates to perform all inside
prison work and most outside prison work if controlled by the state.
In the rare circumstances where prisoners work for outside
employers, the "economic reality" test serves to separate state
controlled labor from freely contracted labor which is deserving of
the minimum wage.
The numerous standards that have been espoused by circuit
courts and academics, however, are not controlling and there is
much disagreement on the precise answer to this difficult question.
This results in a federal statute being implemented differently from
state to state. The Supreme Court or Congress must take up this
issue in order to dispel the confusion and to guarantee that the
FLSA is consistently applied to prison laborers no matter which
state they are serving.

103. Henthom, 29 F.3d at 686.

